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Th e European Court of Human Rights 
and Internet-Related Cases
Abstract: Th e Internet-related cases coming to the European Court of Human Rights provide a good 
illustration of the challenges posed to the protection of human rights as based on the European Convention 
of Human Rights draft ed in 1950. Considering that the Convention is a 70-year-old instrument, the 
Strasbourg Court has to deal with these cases using the body of principles and interpretation methods 
and techniques that has been developed so far, and in particular the ‘living instrument’ doctrine. In this 
study I propose to explore some main threads in the Court’s jurisprudence on Internet-related cases, 
outlining the specifi c nature of Internet-related cases, discussing the problem of rights connected with 
the Internet as well as the impact of the Internet on such classical rights as freedom of expression and the 
right to privacy. I conclude that the Internet-related case law of the Convention is in a process of constant 
development. Th e Strasbourg Court has demonstrated that it is capable of dealing with Internet-related 
cases based on general Convention norms and using its well-developed interpretation techniques. Th e 
striking feature of Strasbourg’s case law is the ECtHR’s recognition of the considerable importance of 
the Internet as regards the exercise of freedom of expression, and in particular freedom to seek and 
access information. Although the ECtHR regards the Internet as a communication medium, however, 
it recognises its specifi c features which aff ect the performance of rights protected by the Convention as 
well as dangers it poses for the protection of human rights under the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
Keywords: human rights, Internet, the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights
Introduction 
Technological advancements undoubtedly have considerable implications for 
human rights. It is true to say that these implications can be benefi cial from the 
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point of view of securing the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, technological 
progress, resulting in advancements such as developments in artifi cial intelligence, 
automation and robotics, raises serious questions about the potentially adverse 
impact on human rights. Th e development of the Internet during the last thirty years 
has certainly been one of the most important technological inventions; its emergence 
has signifi cantly aff ected a number of aspects of everyday life, including, in particular, 
communication, learning, working, shopping, etc. It has also enabled new forms of 
social interaction, activities and social associations. However, it is no wonder that 
the use of the Internet creates a number of problems from the point of view of the 
protection of human rights.
International human rights treaties adopted aft er the Second World War 
were draft ed at a time when the Internet was not known in societies. In this study, 
I propose to analyse some aspects of the impact of the Internet on human rights, 
taking as an example the European Convention of Human Rights (‘the Convention’ 
or ‘ECHR’), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. It is undoubtedly the most 
important instrument among conventions adopted within the Council of Europe and 
the most important regional instrument in the fi eld of human rights in Europe. Th e 
Convention, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the 
Court’ or ‘the ECtHR’) acting on its basis, provides standards for the protection of 
these rights for the 47 Member States of the Council of Europe. 
Th e Convention is a relatively old international instrument, and when it was 
adopted more than 70 years ago, the aforementioned technological advancements 
of modernity could not have been taken into account by its draft ers. It should be 
noted that the ECHR contains general norms and obligations providing only the 
framework which states ‘have the duty to fi ll in with their own content’.1 Th erefore, 
the challenges posed to the protection of human rights in the ECHR by technological 
advancements have to be dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights, whose 
task, according to Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the 
Protocols. Th e Strasbourg Court, whose jurisdiction extends, according to Article 32 
Section 2 of the ECHR, to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of 
the Convention and the Protocols, has developed a body of principles, interpretation 
methods and techniques to deal with this task, and one of the most important of 
those methods is the ‘living instrument’ doctrine, allowing the Court to interpret the 
Convention norms in the light of present-day conditions.2
1 C.  Mik, Charakter, struktura i zakres zobowiązań z Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka, 
„Państwo i Prawo” 1992, no. 4, p. 5.
2 Th e Court has observed on many occasions that the Convention is to be seen ‘a living instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’; Judgement of the ECtHR of 25 
April 1978 on the case of application no. 5856/72, § 31. See also S. Flogartis, T. Zwart and J. Fraser, 
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Th e aim of this article is to explore some of the main threads in the Court’s 
jurisprudence concerning Internet-related cases with the assumption that its case 
law refl ects the most important challenges for human rights posed by the Internet. 
Th is study is by no means exhaustive; instead it focuses on some selected issues 
connected with Internet-related cases. Aft er outlining the specifi c nature of Internet-
related cases, I will discuss the problem of rights connected with the Internet as well 
as the impact of the Internet on such classical rights as freedom of expression and 
the right to privacy, with the aim of arriving at some more general observations and 
conclusions concerning the tendencies in the Internet-related Strasbourg case law.
1. Th e Specifi c Nature of Internet-Related Cases 
Internet-related cases involve quite complex jurisdictional issues. According to 
Article 1 of the ECHR, the state parties to the Convention are obliged to ‘secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defi ned in Section I of this 
Convention’. Th e state parties thus may be held responsible for any violation of the 
protected rights and freedoms of anyone within their ‘jurisdiction’ – or competence – 
at the time of the violation.3 Th e exercise of jurisdiction is thus a necessary condition 
for holding a contracting state responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which 
resulted in an allegation of the infringement of Convention rights and freedoms.4
Th e notion of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention 
should be understood, in the light of international law, as primarily territorial, so 
it is presumed to be exercised usually throughout the state’s territory.5 In certain 
cases, the ECtHR extends the territorial jurisdiction to other areas which, at the time 
of the alleged violation, were, for example, under the ‘overall control’ of the state 
concerned.6 However, the issue of whether exceptional circumstances exist which 
require and justify a fi nding by the Court that the state was exercising jurisdiction 
extra-territorially must be determined every time with reference to particular facts, 
for example full and exclusive control over a prison or a ship.7
Th e European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents. Turning Criticism into Strength, 
Cheltenham/Northampton 2013, pp. 198–199. 
3 Judgement of the ECtHR of 8 April 2004 on the case of Assanidze v. Georgia, application no. 
71503/01, § 137.
4 Judgement of the ECtHR of 8 July 2004 on the case of Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
application no. 48787/99, § 311.
5 Assanidze v. Georgia, op. cit., § 139.
6 Judgement of the ECtHR of 23 March 1995 on the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, application 
no. 15318/89.
7 Judgement of the ECtHR of 7 July 2011 on the case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, 
application no. 55721/07, § 132. See also E. Karska and K. Karski, Introduction: Extraterritorial 




Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
In a number of cases, the Court recognised the exercise by a contracting 
state of its ‘jurisdiction’ outside its territory within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention. Th e crucial condition in these cases is whether the state party to the 
Convention exercised eff ective power and control outside its national territory.  In 
its fi rst judgement in Loizidou v. Turkey, the Court ruled that, bearing in mind the 
object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a contracting party may 
also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it 
exercises eff ective control of an area outside its national territory.8
Th e characteristic feature of Internet-related cases is a cross-border element. 
In the case of communication via the Internet, the data are usually transmitted 
via servers located in various territorial jurisdictions. Th is sometimes results in 
considerable diffi  culties when it comes to establishing which state has jurisdiction in 
a given case.
Considering this specifi c condition, it is surprising, fi rstly, that there have so 
far been relatively few Internet-related cases concerning jurisdictional issues in 
Strasbourg.9 Secondly, it is noteworthy that the Court appears generally in favour of 
the assertion of the state party of its own jurisdiction. An illustration of this can be 
seen in the case of Perrin v. the United Kingdom, in which the applicant, a French 
national living in the United Kingdom, was charged and subsequently convicted in 
the UK by the Crown Court for publishing obscene content on three diff erent web 
pages. Contesting his convictions, the applicant raised, among other things, that 
publication of the web pages had taken place outside UK jurisdiction. He argued 
that English courts should only be able to convict when the major steps towards 
publication took place within their jurisdiction. Addressing this jurisdictional point, 
the Court of Appeal noted that ‘the applicant’s suggestion, that conviction should 
only be possible where major steps had been taken towards publication in a place 
over which the court had jurisdiction, would undermine the aim that the law was 
intended to protect by encouraging publishers to take the steps towards publication 
in countries where they were unlikely to be prosecuted’. Th is line of reasoning was 
accepted by the ECtHR who declared the application inadmissible.10
Th e specifi c nature of the Internet-related cases stems also from certain 
features of the Internet in the context of human rights. In its case law involving 
alleged violations of rights in connection with the Internet, the Strasbourg Court 
has made some important observations concerning features of the Internet in the 
8 Loizidou v. Turkey, op. cit., § 62.
9 See Internet: Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of Europe, 2011, updated 
June 2015, p. 6, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/research_report_internet_eng.pdf (accessed 
25.04.2021).
10 Decision of the ECtHR of 18 October 2005 as to the admissibility of the case of Perrin v. the 
United Kingdom, application no. 5446/03, p. 3.
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context of rights protected under the ECHR. Th e Internet has been evaluated from 
the perspective of its benefi cial impact on the exercise of some protected rights, 
in particular the freedom to receive information, as well as some of its potentially 
adverse eff ects on the exercise of some rights, such as rights to privacy. First of all, the 
ECtHR has emphasised the importance of Internet sites in the exercise of freedom 
of expression, in particular as regards the facilitation of receiving information. 
According to the Court, ‘the Internet has now become one of the principal means by 
which individuals exercise their right to freedom to receive and impart information 
and ideas’.11 In the case of Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom, the Court 
emphasised the signifi cance of the Internet, especially in the context of the right 
to receive information protected under Article 10, by saying that ‘in the light of its 
accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, 
the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and 
facilitating the dissemination of information in general. Th e maintenance of Internet 
archives is a critical aspect of this role and the Court therefore considers that such 
archives fall within the ambit of the protection aff orded by Article 10.’12 Moreover, the 
Strasbourg Court has stressed ‘the substantial contribution made by Internet archives 
to preserving and making available news and information. Such archives constitute 
an important source for education and historical research, particularly as they are 
readily accessible to the public and are generally free.’13 
Th e Strasbourg Court considers Internet sites as ‘an information and 
communication tool’.14 However, it points out the diff erence between the Internet 
and printed media. According to the ECHR, this diff erence is particularly visible as 
regards the capacity to store and transmit information. It is also visible as regards 
regulations and control. As the ECtHR observed, the Internet, ‘as the electronic 
network which serves billions of users worldwide, is not and potentially will never be 
subject to the same regulations and control as printed media’.15 Furthermore, ‘the risk 
of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private 
life, is certainly higher than that posed by the press’, the reason being, in particular, 
the important role of search engines.16 Th e specifi city of the Internet also lies in ‘the 
11 Judgement of the ECtHR of 1 December 2015 on the case of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 
application nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, § 49. 
12 Judgement of the ECtHR of 10 March 2009 on the case of Times Newspapers Ltd nos. 1 and 2 v. 
the United Kingdom, application nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, § 27.
13 Ibidem, §§ 27 and 45.
14 Judgement of the ECtHR of 5 May 2011 on the case of Editorial Board of PravoyeDelo and Shtekel 
v. Ukraine, application no. 33014/05, § 63.
15 Ibidem.
16 Judgement of the ECtHR of 28 June 2018 on the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, application 
nos. 60798/10 and 65599/10, § 91.
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ease, scope and speed of the dissemination of information on the Internet, and the 
persistence of the information once disclosed’.17 Th is, as the Court observed, ‘may 
considerably aggravate the eff ects of unlawful speech on the Internet compared to 
traditional media’.18
One of the consequences of these particular features of the Internet pointed 
out by the Court is that ‘the policies governing reproduction of material from the 
printed media and the Internet may diff er. Th e latter undeniably have to be adjusted 
according to the technology’s specifi c features in order to secure the protection and 
promotion of the rights and freedoms concerned.’19
Th e Court is not blind as regards the sometimes serious threats to the protection 
of Convention rights connected with the Internet, noticing, inter alia, that ‘the rapid 
development of telecommunications technologies in recent decades has led to the 
emergence of new types of crime and has also enabled the commission of traditional 
crimes by means of new technologies’.20 It is, however, primarily up to states to take 
proper measures and introduce adequate safeguards. As the Court put it in the case of 
K.U. v. Finland concerning child sexual abuse on the Internet, ‘it was well-known that 
the Internet, precisely because of its anonymous character, could be used for criminal 
purposes… Also, the widespread problem of child sexual abuse had become well 
known over the preceding decade. Th erefore, it cannot be said that the respondent 
Government did not have the opportunity to put in place a system to protect child 
victims from being exposed as targets for pedophiliac approaches via the Internet.’21
Th e recognition by the Court of such threats and dangers is refl ected, among others, 
in its case law concerning the liability of host providers, administrators, etc. for posting 
insulting, vulgar comments, etc., which will be discussed in the point concerning 
‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’. Th is position of the Court regarding the role 
of Internet, outlined above, has apparently had considerable impact on the ECtHR’s 
approach towards the two rights usually mentioned in connection with the Internet, 
namely regarding the right of access to the Internet and the right to be forgotten.
2. Rights Connected with the Internet
2.1 Right of Access to the Internet
Th e importance of the Internet, especially from the point of view of enhancing 
freedom of expression, begs the question of access to the Internet and in particular 
17 Judgement of the ECtHR of 16  June 2015 on the case of Delfi  AS v. Estonia, application no. 
64569/09, § 147.
18 Ibidem.
19 Editorial Board v. Ukraine, op. cit., § 67. 
20 Judgement of the ECtHR of 2 December 2008 on the case of K.U.  v. Finland, application no. 
2872/02, § 22.
21 Ibidem, § 48.
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whether there exists some right of access to the Internet. It is noteworthy that access 
to the Internet can be understood either as access to content or access to the technical 
infrastructure required to access the Internet.
Th e matter of access to the Internet has gained some recognition at the UN 
level. For example, the report of the Special Rapporteur to the UN General Assembly 
stated: ‘Given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realising a range 
of human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating development and human 
progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should be a priority for all States. 
Each State should thus develop a concrete and eff ective policy, in consultation with 
individuals from all sections of society, including the private sector and relevant 
Government ministries, to make the Internet widely available, accessible and 
aff ordable to all segments of population.’22 It is noteworthy that the report confi rms 
two dimensions of Internet access, that is, access to content and access to the physical 
and technical infrastructure required to access the Internet.23 Referring to this report, 
the Human Rights Council adopted the resolution on the ‘Promotion and protection 
of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the 
right to development’ on 16 July 2012, in which, among other things, it called upon all 
states ‘to promote and facilitate access to the Internet and international cooperation 
aimed at the development of media and information and communications facilities in 
all countries’.24 Also, in the resolution of 2016, the Council condemned ‘unequivocally 
measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of information 
online in violation of international human rights law and calls on all States to refrain 
from and cease such measures’.25
A similar approach was adopted by other international organisations. For 
example, in its report of 2011, the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe emphasised that ‘Everyone should have a right to participate in the 
information society and states have a responsibility to ensure citizens’ access to the 
Internet is guaranteed.’26 In EU law, Internet access is not as yet included among 
the fundamental rights and principles, and according to EU policy documents, 
22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, GE.11–13201, 16 May 2011, https://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ 17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (accessed 26.04.2021).
23 Ibidem, p. 1.
24 Human Rights Council: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 2011, A/HRC/17/27, 
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G12/153/25/PDF/G1215325.
pdf?OpenElement (accessed 23.06.2021).
25 Human Rights Council: Th e promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet, 27 June 2016, https://www.article19.org/data/fi les/Internet_Statement_Adopted.pdf 
(accessed 23.06.2021).
26 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, ‘Freedom of Expression on the Internet: 
A study of legal provisions and practices related to freedom of expression, the free fl ow of 
116
Adam Wiśniewski
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Internet access is regarded a tool which can contribute to improving the functioning 
of the internal market by generating economic wealth and can also provide some 
social benefi ts to citizens.27 Under the Directive 2002/22 / EC on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services as 
amended in 2009 by Directive 2009/136 / EC, recital 5612, the EU Member States are 
required to adopt domestic measures implementing the objectives of the Directive, 
such as providing access to a broadband connection at fi xed points. Th e Directive 
also establishes a minimum quality standard for Internet access.28
In the context of these developments, the outstanding document is certainly 
Resolution 1987 on ‘Th e right to Internet access’, issued by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2014, in which the Assembly recommended 
that the Council of Europe’s Member States ensure the right to Internet access on the 
basis of principles mentioned in this resolution.29 Th ese principles include, among 
others, the recognition that the right to Internet access is an essential requirement for 
exercising rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, that the right to 
Internet access includes the right to access, receive and impart information and ideas 
through the Internet without interference from public authorities, and that Internet 
access is also essential for the exercise of other human rights, such as the right to 
freedom of assembly and the right to private and family life, therefore Member States 
should recognise the fundamental right to Internet access in law and in practice.30
Based on these developments, some authors have expressed the view that 
‘nowadays it is possible to say that access to the Internet is gradually becoming an 
independent human right’.31 At the national level, however, only a few countries have 
decided to introduce the right of access to the Internet, usually in some limited form. 
For example, Estonia introduced the right of access to the public Internet through an 
information and media pluralism on the Internet in OSCE participating States’, 15 December 
2011, https://www.osce.org/fi les/f/ documents/e/f/80723.pdf (accessed 23.06.2021), p. 38.
27 L. Jasmontaite and P. de Hert, Access to the Internet in the EU: A Policy Priority, a Fundamental, 
a Human Right or a Concern for eGovernment? ‘Brussels Privacy Hub Working Paper’ February 
2020, vol. 6, no. 19, p. 5, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339860840_Access_to_the_
Internet_in_the_EU_a_policy_priority_a_fundamental_a_human_right_or_a_concern_for_
eGovernment(accessed 23.06.2021).
28 See ibidem, pp. 3–21.
29 Resolution 1987 (2014),  ‘Th e right to Internet access’, https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/
Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fi leid=20870&lang=en (accessed 24.06.2021).
30 Ibidem, paragraphs 5.1., 5.2. and 5.4.
31 See, for example, M. Zieliński, Dostęp do Internetu jako prawo człowieka? W sprawie potrzeby 
nowej wolności w konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, ‘Przegląd Sejmowy’ 2013, no. 4, pp. 21–
22; M.L. Best, Can the Internet Be a Human Right? (in:) S. Hick, E.F. Halpin and E. Hoskins (eds.), 
Human Rights and the Internet, New York 2000, p. 24.
117
The European Court of Human Rights and Internet-Related Cases
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Internet link, and in Finland the relevant provisions of law provide for the obligation 
of telecommunication operators to ensure a proper Internet link.32
Against this background it may be rather surprising that the Strasbourg Court 
appears to be slow and perhaps somewhat reluctant to recognise the general right of 
access to the Internet under Article 10 of the ECHR, although its rulings in this area 
depend to a large extent on the specifi c circumstances of the case. For example, in the 
case of Kalda v. Estonia, the Court found that there is no right of access to the Internet 
for prisoners, following from Article 10 of the Convention. Th e case concerned an 
applicant, a prisoner in Estonia, who complained that the authorities’ refusal to grant 
him access to certain websites violated his right to receive information ‘without 
interference by public authority’, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. Th e Court, 
observed, however, that: ‘imprisonment inevitably involves a number of restrictions 
on prisoners’ communications with the outside world, including their ability to 
receive information’, and according to the ECtHR, ‘Article 10 cannot be interpreted as 
imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specifi c Internet 
sites, for prisoners. However, it fi nds that in the circumstances of the case, since 
access to certain sites containing legal information is granted under Estonian law, 
the restriction of access to other sites that also contain legal information constitutes 
an interference with the right to receive information.’33 Th e fi nding of the violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention in this case was the result of fi nding that the interference 
with the applicant’s right to receive information, in the specifi c circumstances of the 
present case, cannot be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society.34
An interesting approach to access to the Internet in prison was adopted by the 
Court in the case of Mehmet Reşit Arslan and Orhan Bingöl v. Turkey, in which the 
applicants, serving sentences of life imprisonment as a result of their convictions 
for membership of an illegal armed organisation, complained that they were being 
prevented from using a computer and accessing the Internet, i.e. resources essential 
in order for them to continue their higher education and improve their general 
knowledge. Interestingly, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 
2 (the right to education) of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of both 
applicants, fi nding that domestic courts had failed to strike a fair balance between 
their right to education on the one hand and the imperatives of public order on the 
other. Moreover, the Court observed, in particular, that the importance of education 
in prison had been recognised by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
32 See J.  Rzucidło, Prawo dostępu do internetu jako podstawowe prawo człowieka: Część I, 
„Kwartalnik Naukowy Prawo Mediów Elektronicznych” 2010, no. 2, p. 38.
33 Judgement of the ECtHR of 19  January 2016 on the case of Kalda v. Estonia, application no. 
17429/10, § 45.
34 Ibidem, § 54.
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Europe in its recommendations on education in prison and in its European Prison 
Rules.35
In a number of cases, mostly against Turkey and Russia, the Court had to deal 
with the blocking of access to the Internet by domestic authorities. Th e blocking was 
found acceptable if it was made on grounds such as the protection of copyright. In 
the case of Akdeniz v. Turkey, the blocking of access to two websites was eff ected on 
the grounds that they streamed music without respecting copyright legislation. Th e 
application in this case was lodged by the applicant who was a user of the websites in 
question. Th e ECtHR declared the application inadmissible on the grounds that the 
applicant could not claim to be a ‘victim’ in the sense of Article 34 of the Convention. 
Although the rights of Internet users were declared to be of paramount importance, 
nevertheless the Court observed that the two music-streaming websites in question 
had been blocked because they operated in breach of copyright law. Moreover, 
the Court further observed that the applicant had at his disposal many means to 
access a range of musical works without thereby contravening the rules governing 
copyright.36
Th e Court is more likely to fi nd a violation if the blocking of websites takes place 
due to other reasons than the protection of copyright. In the case of Ahmet Yıldırım 
v. Turkey, a Turkish court decided to block access to Google Sites hosting an Internet 
site whose owner was involved in criminal proceedings for insulting the memory 
of Atatürk. Th e applicant complained that he was deprived of access to his own 
Internet site because of this measure, which was ordered in the context of criminal 
proceedings without any connection to him or his site. Th e Court found a violation of 
Article 10 on the ground of the principle of proportionality, namely, that the decision 
to block all access to Google Sites was made ‘without ascertaining whether a less far-
reaching measure could have been taken to block access specifi cally to the off ending 
website’.37 Moreover, the eff ects of the measure in question had been arbitrary and the 
judicial review of the blocking of access had been insuffi  cient to prevent abuses.38
In the case of Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, the applicants had been deprived 
of all access to YouTube as a result of a court order, on the grounds that a post on 
YouTube had infringed the country’s criminal law which prohibited insulting the 
memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Th e Court found that there was a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. As in the case of Ahmet Yıldırım, according to the 
Court the authorities should have taken into consideration the fact that the measure 
35 Judgement of the ECtHR of 7 October 2019 on the case of Mehmet Reşit Arslan and Orhan Bingöl 
v. Turkey, application nos. 47121/06, 13988/07 and 34750/07, § 69–72.
36 Decision of the ECtHR of 11 March 2014 as to the admissibility of the case of Akdeniz v. Turkey, 
application no. 20877/10.
37 Judgement of the ECtHR of 18 December 2012 of the case of Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, application 
no. 3111/10, § 64.
38 Ibidem.
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in question was bound to substantially restrict the rights of Internet users and to have 
a signifi cant collateral eff ect by rendering large quantities of information inaccessible. 
Moreover, as a result of the ordered measure, the applicants had no access to YouTube 
for a lengthy period.39
In cases where blocking access to a website was a result of a measure imposed 
before a fi nal ruling by a court, such blocking was considered as a prior restraint. 
According to the ECHR, prior restraints are not necessarily incompatible with the 
Convention as a matter of principle.40 Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that 
a legal framework is required, ensuring both tight control over the scope of bans 
and eff ective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power. What is important 
is that such a framework should establish ‘precise and specifi c rules regarding the 
application of preventive restrictions on freedom of expression’.41 Moreover, within 
such a framework there should be the possibility of judicial review of a questioned 
measure, such as the one blocking access to a particular website. Such a review should 
be based on a weighing-up of the competing interests at stake and be designed to 
strike a balance between them.42
Likewise, in the case of Kablis v. Russia, the applicant’s access to three blog 
entries had been restricted on the order of the Prosecutor General’s offi  ce because 
they had been found to contain calls to participate in public events held in breach 
of established procedure. As the Court observed, the aim of the public event in 
question was to express an opinion on an important issue of public interest, namely 
the recent arrest of regional government offi  cials. Th e Court reminded that under its 
case law, ‘expression on matters of public interest is entitled to strong protection’ and 
that ‘very strong reasons are required for justifying such restrictions’.43 Nevertheless, 
the domestic authorities failed to advance any reasons for blocking access to the 
two above-mentioned posts and did not explain why they had been included in 
the blocking measure, even though they did not contain any calls for participation 
in a public event held in breach of established procedure. Finding a violation of 
Article 10 in this case, the Court also pointed out that the domestic law lacked the 
necessary guarantees against abuse required by the Court’s case law for prior restraint 
measures.44
Th e important lesson following from the above judgements is that the blocking 
of Internet sites, even if it amounts to prior restraint, is not as such incompatible 
with the Convention. However, it needs to meet certain requirements laid down in 
39 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, op. cit., § 57.
40 Yıldırım v. Turkey, op. cit., § 47.
41 Ibidem, § 67.
42 Ibidem.
43 Judgement of the ECtHR of 30 April 2019 on the case of Kablis v. Russia, application nos. 48310/16 
and 59663/17, § 101.
44 Ibidem, § 106.
120
Adam Wiśniewski
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
Strasbourg case law. In particular, the proper legal framework should be established, 
providing precise and specifi c rules and allowing domestic courts to adequately 
balance competing interests. Moreover, strong reasons need to be provided in 
cases where restrictions are imposed on public debate and on political speech. Th e 
necessary test involving proportionality plays an important role in deciding such 
cases by the Strasbourg Court. As one author observed, in a number of cases, states 
failed to comply with the requirements of this test and the principle of proportionality 
connected with it, especially because there were less intrusive methods available.45 It 
follows from Strasbourg case law that restrictions on Internet access are considered 
to be a drastic limitation of freedom of expression and are treated as the measure of 
last resort, which has to be supported by very convincing reasons.
2.2. Th e Right to Be Forgotten
One of the rights which is nowadays commonly associated with the Internet 
is the ‘right to be forgotten’ which was, as is sometimes presented, introduced by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in its judgement of 13 May 2014 on 
the case C 131/12, Google Spain sl v. AEPD (the DPA) & Mario Costeja González. 
Th e case originated in the complaint brought in March 2010 by a Spanish national, 
Costeja González, before the country’s data protection agency (AEPD) against  La 
Vanguardia  newspaper, Google Spain, and Google Inc. In his complaint, Mr 
González demanded the removal or alteration of the record of legal action taken 
against him concerning the auction of his property in 1998. Th e information should 
be removed, he argued, because the proceedings were concluded years earlier and 
there was no outstanding claim against Mr González. Th e fact that the information 
continued to feature prominently had been damaging his reputation. Th e complaint 
against Google was upheld on the ground that search engines are also subject to data 
protection laws and must take necessary steps to protect personal information. As the 
result of Google Inc.’s and Google Spain’s appeals against the decision of the AEPD, 
the National High Court of Spain decided to stay the proceedings and request the EU 
Court of Justice give a preliminary ruling.
Th e Court of Justice found Mr González had the right to request the erasure 
of his personal data from Google and, consequently, Google had the obligation to 
erase them.46 In its reasoning, the CJ considered that although search engines have 
the right to process personal data when this is necessary in order for the legitimate 
interest of the data holder or the interests of third parties, this right is not, however, 
45 G. Gosztonyi, European Court of Human Rights: Internet Access as a Means of Receiving and 
Imparting Information and Ideas, ‘International Comparative Jurisprudence’ 2020, vol. 6, no. 
2, p. 139, https://ojs.mruni.eu/ojs/international-comparative-jurisprudence/article/view/6292 
(accessed 21.04.2021). 
46 Judgement of the Court of Justice of 13 May 2014 on the case of Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, C 131/12, p. 21.
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absolute and may be limited when it collides with the interests or the fundamental 
rights of the data subject, in particular the right to privacy.47 
Th e right to be forgotten was confi rmed in Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, which repealed Directive 95/46 / EC (the General 
Data Protection Regulation) entitled ‘Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)’ which 
provides that ‘Th e data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller 
the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the 
controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay 
where… the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they were collected or otherwise processed.’
However, in its case law the ECtHR appeared to be reluctant to recognise the 
right to be forgotten on the Internet.48 One of the examples of this position can 
be seen in the judgement on the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, in which the 
applicants alleged a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR on account of the decision of 
the Federal Court of Justice not to prohibit various media outlets from making old 
reports – or transcripts thereof – concerning the applicants’ criminal trial available 
on the Internet. Th e applicants were sentenced to life imprisonment for the 1991 
murder of W.S, a very popular actor. Aft er being released from prison in 2008, they 
brought actions against a German radio station and a weekly magazine, asking that 
articles and radio interviews relating to the murder case be removed from their 
website archives.
In the substantiation of its judgement, the Strasbourg Court acknowledged, 
among other things, that the concept of ‘private life’ refers to ‘personal information 
which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their 
consent’.49 Th e ECtHR analysed in some depth, among others, the judgement of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 May 2014 (Google Spain and Google) as 
well as the relevant EU law on this. However, the Strasbourg Court fi nally found that 
there had been no violation of the right to privacy of the applicants protected under 
Article 8 of the Convention. However, the Court observed that in order for Article 8 
to become applicable, ‘an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of 
seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to 
47 As some authors point out, this judgement is regarded as ‘a point of reference in the protection of 
personal data in the European [sic], but also the international level’. See K. Kakavoulis, Th e case 
Google Spain v. AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez of the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
A Brief Critical Analysis, https://www.homodigitalis.gr/en/posts/2900 (accessed 24.04.2021).
48 V. Szeghalmi, Diffi  culties Regarding the Right to Be Forgotten in the Case Law of the Strasbourg 
Court, “Athens Journal of Law” 2018, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 270.
49 Judgement of the ECtHR of 28 June 2018 on the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, application 
nos. 60798/10 and 65599/10, § 86.
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respect for private life. Moreover, Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain 
of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions such 
as, for example, the commission of a criminal off ence.’50
Th e case was decided by using the balancing method combined with the margin 
of appreciation doctrine. Th us the ECtHR balanced the right to privacy protected 
under Article 8 against freedom of expression and freedom to access information 
under Article 10 of the European Convention, holding, however, that national 
authorities enjoy the margin of appreciation in weighing up diverging interests in this 
case.51 Nevertheless, behind the veil of the margin of appreciation doctrine lies the 
appreciation by the Court, declared elsewhere in this judgement, of the importance of 
the Internet, especially ‘as a source for education and historical research, particularly 
as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free’.52 Th e ECtHR 
went further, emphasising ‘the establishment of digital archives, which contribute 
signifi cantly to enhancing the public’s access to information and its dissemination’,53 
and, most importantly, said that according to its case law, ‘the legitimate interest of 
the public in access to the public Internet archives of the press is protected under 
Article 10 of the Convention, and particularly strong reasons must be provided for 
any measure limiting access to information which the public has the right to receive’.54 
Th us, the Court clearly took a position in favour of the presumption of uninhibited 
access by the public to Internet archives. Th e margin of appreciation concept was in 
fact used as an indication of acceptance by the ECtHR of the position taken in this 
case by German courts in particular that there is a very high public interest in being 
able to access information about important past events such as the murder case at 
issue. It is thus no wonder that some authors correctly point out that the current case 
law of the Strasbourg Court appears to indicate that the ECtHR is more in favour 
of a right to remember, appearing to be rather reluctant to recognise the right to be 
forgotten in the online sphere.55 Th e right to remember for the Court amounts to free 
access by the public to information that can be found on the Internet, whereas the 
right to be forgotten appears to be limiting access to information which the public 
has the right to receive.
A position in favour of the right to be forgotten was taken by the Court in the 
case of Hurbain v. Belgium, in which the applicant complained that he had been 
ordered to anonymise the archived version of an article on his newspaper’s website. 
Th e article in question was published in the newspaper Le Soir and reported on a car 
50 Ibidem, § 88.
51 Ibidem, § 116.
52 Ibidem, § 90.
53 Ibidem, § 102.
54 Ibidem.
55 V. Szeghalmi, Diffi  culties, op. cit., p. 270.
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accident that had caused the deaths of two persons and injured three others. In this 
article, the full name of a driver who had been responsible for this road accident was 
mentioned. Th e driver, who had been convicted in 2000, had served his sentence 
and was rehabilitated in 2006, sued Mr Hurbain successfully in 2012 to obtain the 
anonymisation of the press article about him. In its judgement, the Court agreed with 
the domestic courts’ fi ndings that keeping the article online could cause indefi nite 
and serious harm to the driver’s reputation, creating a sort of ‘virtual criminal 
record’ despite the fact that the driver had already been rehabilitated aft er serving 
his sentence aft er a fi nal conviction. Finding that the Belgian courts had weighed up 
the driver’s right to respect for his private life on the one hand and Mr Hurbain’s 
freedom of expression on the other, in accordance with the criteria laid down in the 
Court’s case law, the Strasbourg Court held that there had therefore been no violation 
of Article 10 in the case.56
3. Freedom of Expression and the Internet
As was already mentioned, the Court has repeatedly stressed in its case law the 
importance of Internet sites for the exercise of freedom of expression. Th e Internet 
is correctly regarded as a means of communication, and freedom of expression 
on the Internet is protected under Article 10 of the Convention.57 Th is protection 
extends regardless of the type of message or the purpose of its publication. Th erefore, 
publications for commercial purposes are also covered. For example, the publication 
of photographs on an Internet site devoted to fashion which off ered the public 
pictures of fashion shows either for sale or for consultation (the latter free of charge 
or for a fee) was considered as protected under Article 10 of the Convention.58
Th e Court applies the same principles concerning freedom of expression 
developed in its case law under Article 10 to freedom of expression on the Internet, 
confi rming, among other things, that ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for each individual’s self-fulfi lment’. Subject to Paragraph 2 of Article 
10, it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or 
regarded as inoff ensive or as a matter of indiff erence, but also to those that off end, 
56 Judgement of the ECtHR of 22 June 2021 on the case of Hurbain v. Belgium, application no. 
57292/16 (in French), §§ 125–133. 
57 Internet: Case-law, op. cit., p. 17.
58 Judgement of the ECtHR of 10 January 2013 on the case of Ashby Donald and Others v. France, 
application no. 36769/08, § 34.
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shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, 
without which there is no ‘democratic society’.59 
Th erefore, the Court is willing to grant strong protection and allow 
a corresponding narrow margin of appreciation for domestic authorities in the 
case of political speech, and weaker protection and a wider scope of the margin of 
appreciation in the case of commercial speech.60 Th e strong protection of political 
speech is closely connected with the role of the press as the ‘public watchdog’ in 
a democratic society whose task is to control the government. Th erefore the press 
is entitled to the wider limits of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
Convention as well.61 Th e application of these principles by the Court to freedom 
of expression on the Internet leaves little room for concepts such as the right to be 
forgotten.
Moreover, certain categories of speech are excluded from the protection of 
Article 10 of the Convention, regardless of whether the speech is communicated on 
the Internet or through other media of communication. Th is refers in particular to 
hate speech which is insulting to particular individuals or groups or any other speech 
incompatible with the values of the Convention.62 Th e Court is also very likely to 
reject an application in the case of off ensive and injurious speech on the Internet that 
goes beyond merely satirical and defamatory expression.63
Despite the application by the Court of the same general principles developed in 
its case law concerning Article 10 of the ECHR to freedom of expression in Internet-
related cases, there are still some specifi c issues in these cases which the Court has to 
deal with. An interesting comparative analysis of the impact of radio and television 
as contrasted with the Internet was carried out by the Court in the case of Animal 
Defenders International v. the United Kingdom concerning the statutory prohibition 
of paid political advertising on radio and television. Th e applicant argued that limiting 
the prohibition in question to radio and television was illogical, taking into account 
the comparative potency of newer media such as the Internet. Th e ECtHR disagreed, 
fi nding a distinction based on the particular infl uence of the broadcast media to be 
coherent, and said that ‘the Court recognizes the immediate and powerful eff ect 
59 See, for example, the Judgement of the ECtHR of 22 April 2013 on the case of Animal Defenders 
International v. the United Kingdom, application no. 48876/08, § 100.
60 See L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Tom I, 
Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, Warsaw 2010, pp. 626–627; A. Wiśniewski, Koncepcja marginesu 
oceny w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, Gdańsk 2008, pp. 214–215.
61 S.C. Prebensen, Th e Margin of Appreciation and Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention, ‘Human 
Rights Law Journal’ 1998, vol. 19, no. 1, p. 14.
62 See, for example, the Judgement of the ECtHR of 4 December 2003 on the case of Gündüz 
v. Turkey, application no. 35071/97, § 41.
63 Judgement of the ECtHR of 11 March 2014 on the case of Bartnik v. Poland, application no. 
53628/2010; see also Internet: Case-law, op. cit., p. 20.
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of the broadcast media, an impact reinforced by the continuing function of radio 
and television as familiar sources of entertainment in the intimacy of the home. In 
addition, the choices inherent in the use of the Internet and social media mean that 
the information emerging therefrom does not have the same synchronicity or impact 
as broadcasted information. Notwithstanding therefore the signifi cant development 
of the Internet and social media in recent years, there is no evidence of a suffi  ciently 
serious shift  in the respective infl uences of the new and of the broadcast media in the 
respondent State to undermine the need for special measures for the latter.’64
Th e Court also had to deal in its case law with the issue of the liability of the owner 
of an Internet news portal for defamatory comments posted in its commenting area. 
Th e applicant company complained that holding it liable for the comments posted by 
the readers of its Internet news portal infringed its freedom of expression. However, 
the ECtHR considered the insulting and threatening nature of the comments, as well 
as the fact that these comments were posted in reaction to an article published by the 
applicant company in its professionally managed news portal run on a commercial 
basis. Moreover, the Court found the measures taken by the applicant company to 
avoid damage being caused to other parties’ reputations and to ensure a realistic 
possibility that the authors of the comments will be held liable to be insuffi  cient. For 
example, the automatic word-based fi lter which was applied was relatively easy to 
circumvent, thus failing to prevent some insults or threats.65 Taking into account 
a relatively moderate sanction imposed on the applicant company, the Court found 
no violation of Article 10, setting a standard, however, for eff ective prevention by 
media companies for insulting or defamatory posted comments. It is noteworthy 
that the Court omitted in its consideration the Directive on Electronic Commerce66 
(although it is mentioned in the judgement), which governs the liability regime of 
host providers. It is worth mentioning that under this regime, hosting providers are 
not liable for information they store if they do not have actual knowledge of its illegal 
nature or if they act expeditiously to remove or disable access to that information as 
soon as they become aware of it.
Some Internet-related cases concern the question of the liability of the media 
for making accessible various content from Internet sites. An interesting ECtHR 
judgement concerning the liability of media companies for content hyperlinked in 
their articles or reports published online was issued in the Magyar JetiZrt v. Hungary 
case. Th e Strasbourg Court, fi nding a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, 
64 See, for example, Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., § 114.
65 Judgement of the ECtHR of 10 October 2013 on the case of Delfi  AS v. Estonia, application no. 
64569/09, § 87.
66 Directive 2000/31 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
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objected, among other things, to the objective liability imposed by the Hungarian 
courts on the applicant company in this case, because it made any balancing between 
the competing rights, i.e. the right to reputation of the political party (Jobbik) and 
the right to freedom of expression of the applicant company, impossible. According 
to the Court, ‘such objective liability may have foreseeable negative consequences on 
the fl ow of information on the Internet, impelling article authors and publishers to 
refrain altogether from hyperlinking to material over whose changeable content they 
have no control. Th is may have, directly or indirectly, a chilling eff ect on freedom of 
expression on the Internet.’67 An even stronger comment on this can be found in the 
concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, who observed that ‘the Web is 
not intended, as a technology, to function in the way the respondent Government 
states, where spreading information via a hyperlink is itself always a “thought-
content”. Th is approach begs the question of how people are to convey information 
across the estimated trillions of web pages in existence today and countless future 
pages if doing so can give rise to liability. It is too burdensome, and in many cases 
impossible, for people to make a legal determination as to whether each and every 
hyperlinked content is defamatory or otherwise unlawful. If such a burden were to be 
imposed automatically on journalists, by way of an objective liability regime, it would 
stifl e the freedom of the press. To paraphrase the words of Berners-Lee, hyperlinks 
are critical not merely to the digital revolution but to our continued prosperity – and 
even our liberty. Like democracy itself, they need defending.’68 Considering this, the 
Court found the contested measure to be a disproportionate restriction on the right 
to freedom of expression.69
In a case concerning a similar issue, namely Editorial Board of PravoyeDelo 
and Shtekel v. Ukraine, the Court extended its doctrine of positive obligations into 
the area of the Internet. Th e case concerned the publication by an applicant of an 
anonymous letter, downloaded from a news website, which contained allegations of 
unlawful and corrupt activities by one of the senior offi  cials of the Odessa Regional 
Department of the Security Service. Th e ECtHR found the rulings of the national 
courts against the applicants in the defamation case to be a violation of Article 10, 
the reason being, among others, that ‘given the lack of adequate safeguards in the 
domestic law for journalists using information obtained from the Internet, the 
applicants could not foresee to the appropriate degree the consequences which the 
impugned publication might entail’. Th e interference was thus not prescribed by 
67 Judgement of the ECtHR of 4 March 2019 on the case of Magyar JetiZrt v. Hungary, application 
no. 11257/16, § 83.
68 Th e concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in ibidem, § 26.
69 Ibidem, § 84.
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law.70 Moreover, the ECtHR observed that ‘having regard to the role the Internet plays 
in the context of professional media activities and its importance for the exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression generally… the Court considers that the absence 
of a suffi  cient legal framework at the domestic level allowing journalists to use 
information obtained from the Internet without fear of incurring sanctions seriously 
hinders the exercise of the vital function of the press as a “public watchdog”’.71 Th us 
a regulatory framework is needed to ensure the eff ective protection of journalists’ 
freedom of expression on the Internet, and states have a positive obligation under the 
Convention to provide it.72
4. Th e Protection of Private Life and the Internet
As was already mentioned, the Strasbourg Court, at least for a certain period of 
time, did not seem to be much in favour of the right to forget on the Internet, treating 
it rather as a limitation on the public’s access to information available on the Internet, 
although, as was mentioned, this position has changed in the most recent case law. 
However, this does not mean that privacy as such is not protected in Strasbourg case 
law. It has been confi rmed in Strasbourg case law that personal information which 
individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent 
is protected under Article 8 of the ECHR; this also applies to the publication of 
a photograph.73 One of the important aspects of private life in the context of the 
Internet is the protection of personal data. According to the Strasbourg Court, ‘the 
protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment 
of his right to respect for private and family life’.74 States have a positive obligation to 
ensure an eff ective deterrent against grave acts to a person’s personal data, in some 
cases sometimes by means of effi  cient criminal-law provisions.75 Moreover, positive 
obligations inherent in an eff ective respect for private or family life may involve the 
adoption of measures by the state designed to secure respect for private life even in 
the sphere of relations of individuals between themselves, for example an Internet 
user and those who provide access to a particular website.76 
70 Judgement of the ECtHR of 5 May 2011 on the case of Editorial Board of PravoyeDelo and Shtekel 
v. Ukraine, application no. 33014/05, § 66.
71 Ibidem, § 64.
72 See Internet: Case-law, op. cit., p. 17.
73 Judgement of the ECtHR of 12 October 2010 on the case of Saaristo and Others v. Finland, 
application no. 184/06, § 61.
74 Judgement of the ECtHR of 4 December 2008 on the case of S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, 
application nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 103.
75 See Internet: Case-law, op. cit., p. 9.
76 Ibidem, p. 24.
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Th e concept of the positive obligations of a state as regards the protection of 
privacy on the Internet was developed in the case of K.U.  v. Finland concerning 
an advertisement of a sexual nature posted about a 12-year-old boy on an Internet 
dating site. Th e police and the courts could, however, under Finnish legislation at 
the time, require the Internet provider to identify the person who had posted the 
advertisement; the service provider, refusing to identify the person responsible, 
claimed it would constitute a breach of confi dentiality. In its judgement in this case, 
the Court found a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, stating ‘practical and 
eff ective protection of the applicant required that eff ective steps be taken to identify 
and prosecute the perpetrator, that is, the person who placed the advertisement’.77 
Th e ECtHR also pointed out that although freedom of expression and confi dentiality 
of communications ‘are primary considerations and users of telecommunications 
and Internet services must have a guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of 
expression will be respected, such guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on 
occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.78 Th e positive obligations 
in this context mean that the legislator has the task ‘to provide the framework for 
reconciling the various claims which compete for protection in this context. Such 
framework was not, however, in place at the material time, with the result that 
Finland’s positive obligation with respect to the applicant could not be discharged.’79 
As was already mentioned, the Court confi rmed that the risk of harm to the 
exercise and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to 
respect for private life, posed by content and communications on the Internet is 
certainly higher than that posed by the press.80 Taking this, as well as the need to 
protect private life, into account, ‘the policies governing reproduction of material 
from the printed media and the Internet may diff er’, and there is no absolute right to 
reproduce information already published on the Internet.81 Th e higher risk is also 
connected with the ease with which information, even some personal information 
which is not initially meant to be posted online, may be picked up by third parties 
and discussed on the Web to the detriment of the individual’s right to protection of 
private life.82 
Th e Court is aware of particular threats to the protection of private life on the 
Internet connected with the availability and the circulation of information. In the 
case of Delfi  AS v. Estonia, the Court admitted it is mindful ‘of the importance of the 
77 K.U. v. Finland, op. cit., § 49.
78 Ibidem.
79 Ibidem.
80 Editorial Board v. Ukraine, op. cit., § 63.
81 See Internet: Case-law, op. cit., p. 30.
82 Ibidem, p. 16.
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wishes of Internet users not to disclose their identity in exercising their freedom of 
expression. At the same time, the spread of the Internet and the possibility – or for 
some purposes the danger – that information once made public will remain public 
and circulate forever, calls for caution.’83 What is also a specifi c feature of the Internet 
is how relatively easy it is to disclose information there. As a result, it is a diffi  cult task 
to detect defamatory statements and remove them, given also the substantial amount 
of information there.84
Th reats to private life are also posed by the monitoring of telephone calls, e-mail 
correspondence and Internet usage. In the Copland v. the UK case, such monitoring 
was carried out by the employer of the applicant. In this case, the Court found 
that it was irrelevant that the data held by the employer were not disclosed or used 
against the employee her in disciplinary or other proceedings, as just storing the data 
amounted to an interference with the applicant’s private life. Finding a violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention, the Court pointed out that there was no domestic law 
regulating monitoring at the relevant time, so the alleged interference in this case was 
not ‘in accordance with the law’ as required by Article 8 Section 2 of the Convention. 
However, the Court would not exclude the monitoring of an employee’s telephone, 
e-mail or Internet usage at the place of work if such monitoring may be considered 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ in certain situations in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim.85 
A person’s right to the protection of his or her reputation, protected under Article 
8 as part of the right to respect for private life, may be violated by comments posted 
on Internet forums. However, as the judgement on the case of Høiness v. Norway 
demonstrates, the Court does not always fi nd a violation of Article 8. Th e case in 
question concerned an allegation connected with the Norwegian courts’ refusal to 
impose civil liability on an Internet forum host aft er vulgar comments about the 
applicant had been posted on the forum. Th e Court mentioned that in order for 
Article 8 of the Convention to become applicable, ‘the attack on personal honour and 
reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in 
a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private 
life’.86 As such a level was not reached in this case, the Court found ambiguously, 
referring to its controversial margin of appreciation doctrine, that the national courts 
had acted within their margin of appreciation. Th ey did so ‘when seeking to establish 
83 Delfi  AS v. Estonia, op. cit., § 92.
84 Ibidem.
85 Judgement of the ECtHR of 3 April 2007 on the case of Copland v. the United Kingdom, 
application no. 62617/00, § 48.
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a balance between the applicant’s rights under Article 8 and the news portal and host 
of the debate forums’ opposing right to freedom of expression under Article 10’.87
Conclusions
Internet-related cases are a good illustration of how the Strasbourg Court has to 
deal with issues arising out of technological progress while giving its judgements on 
the basis of the Convention which is more than 70 years old. It is thus no wonder, as has 
been observed, that according to the ECtHR, the Convention is to be seen as ‘a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.88 Th is 
approach of the Court to the interpretation of the Convention has turned out to be 
particularly useful and important in deciding Internet-related cases in Strasbourg. It 
has allowed the ECtHR to address a number of specifi c challenges resulting from the 
necessity of the protection of Convention rights in the context of the Internet, such 
as, for example, the issues of the liability of owners of Internet portals for defamatory 
comments, the liability for content hyperlinked in articles published online or the 
obligation of Internet service providers to disclose the identity of persons who post 
potentially criminal content. 
Th e striking feature of Strasbourg’s case law is the ECtHR’s recognition of the 
considerable importance of the Internet for the exercise of freedom of expression and, 
in particular, freedom to seek and access information. Although the ECtHR regards 
the Internet as a communication medium, however, it recognises its specifi c features 
which aff ect the performance of rights protected by the Convention. Th e Internet has 
been evaluated by the Court from the perspective of both its benefi cial impact on 
the exercise of some protected rights, in particular freedom to receive information, 
as well as some of its potentially adverse eff ects on the exercise of some other rights, 
such as rights to privacy. Calling the Internet ‘one of the principal means by which 
individuals exercise their right to freedom to receive and impart information and 
ideas’,89 the Strasbourg Court appears to particularly appreciate its signifi cance as 
regards the enhancing of the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination 
of information in general, in particular in connection with ‘its capacity to store 
and communicate vast amounts of information’.90 At the same time, as the Court 
observed, the risk of damage which may be caused to the exercise and enjoyment 
of human rights, and particularly the right to respect for private life, by content and 
87 Ibidem, § 75.
88 See T. Murphy and G. O Cuinn, Works in Progress: New Technologies and the European Court of 
Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Law Review’ 2010, vol 10, no. 4, p. 635.
89 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, op. cit., § 49.
90 Times Newspapers v. the United Kingdom, op. cit., § 27.
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communications on the Internet is certainly higher than that posed, for example, by 
the press.
As has been demonstrated throughout the above analysis, the technological 
progress exemplifi ed by the emergence of the Internet has had a number of 
implications as regards the protection of human rights under the ECHR. Th ese 
implications include the ‘new’ rights connected with the Internet, such as the right 
of access to the Internet or the right to be forgotten. Th e Court appears to be cautious 
as regards expressing the general recognition of such rights. For example, in cases 
concerning access to the Internet, blocking of Internet sites, even if it amounts to prior 
restraint, is not regarded by the ECtHR as incompatible per se with the Convention. 
Such blocking needs to meet certain requirements laid down in Strasbourg case 
law, however, and appears to be untenable if there are less restrictive and intrusive 
measures available for domestic authorities. Here, the necessity test involving the 
principle of proportionality plays an important role. Th erefore, states usually fail 
to comply with the requirements of necessity and proportionality if restrictions on 
Internet access are considered to be a drastic limitation of freedom of expression. 
Such restrictions are treated as the measure of last resort which have to be supported 
by very convincing reasons.
Th e position of the Court towards such new rights is also evolving. A good 
example is off ered by the right to be forgotten. Here, the ECtHR was inclined to rule 
rather in favour of freedom of expression, indicating the importance of the Internet 
as a tool for enhancing the public’s access to information and its dissemination, for 
example in the case of M.L. and W.W. v. Germany. Th us the interest in uninhibited 
access to Internet archives by the public outweighed the interest of individuals in 
being forgotten on the Internet. However, as was mentioned, in its recent case law 
this position of the Strasbourg Court has shift ed more in favour of the right to be 
forgotten, as was demonstrated in its judgement on the case of Hurbain v. Belgium.
Another important observation is that despite the specifi city of Internet-related 
cases, the Court appears to decide these cases, as has been shown, by fi rmly applying 
the same general principles developed in its case law both under Article 8 of ECHR 
when it comes to the protection of privacy on the Internet as well as under Article 
10 of ECHR when freedom of expression is involved. Certainly, the Internet-related 
case law of the Convention is in the process of constant development. Th e Strasbourg 
Court has proved that it is capable of dealing with Internet-related cases based on 
general Convention norms and using its well-developed interpretation techniques. 
Th e ECtHR undoubtedly faces the challenge of dynamically developing Convention 
standards in its growing Internet-related case law. It is important, however, that these 
new standards are shaped in line with the spirit of the Convention.
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